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Abstract 
 
The purposes of the following thesis is to research United States Supreme Court sex-
discrimination jurisprudence and ascertain if Fourteenth Amendment legislative history was 
used, referred to, cited to, or quoted from, by the Supreme Court Justices in their opinions 
regarding sex-discrimination cases since the Amendment was ratified in 1868. Legislative 
history is a window into the drafting, debating, and intricate crafting of laws and amendments. 
When words and phrases that are used in the statutes, codes, and amendments are ambiguous or 
unclear, judges and justices should use the legislative history to ascertain the intent of the 
framers of the legislation.  
The methodology that was employed for this thesis was through the researching of all 
relevant United States Supreme Court cases as to what was written by the Justices in their 
opinions. Research was conducted into the relevant law review articles on the subject of 
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, Supreme Court sex-discrimination 
jurisprudence, and the historical impact of Court decisions on the law relative to sex-
discrimination. After extensive research, it was discovered that the United States Supreme Court 
has established over 144 years’ worth of sex-discrimination jurisprudence. The law review 
article research revealed that the lack of legislative history research by the Court has not gone 
unnoticed by the legal community or the women’s rights community since the Fourteenth 
Amendment was originally drafted. The research and analysis of the sources of sex-
discrimination from cases, law review articles, and books on the subject, led to the conclusion 
that no Fourteenth Amendment legislative history was ever used by the Supreme Court of the 
United States as part of its development of sex-discrimination jurisprudence. 
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Introduction 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was finally ratified by 
three-fourths of the States in the Union by July 9, 1868. But the real work by the duly elected 
legislators was done between 1865 and 1867. The Amendment’s Framers worked in committees, 
party caucuses, and finally in the main chambers of the Congress to draft and complete this 
important addition to the supreme law of the land. The congressional members of the committees 
charged with crafting the language for the Amendment debated long and hard regarding what 
words should, could, and needed to be used, and the intentions behind them. The record of these 
debates ended up as legislative history.  
When a statute, code, or Amendment contains language that is unclear, or purposefully 
ambiguous to allow for expansion through future interpretation, courts are supposed to use the 
legislative history of a Constitutional Amendment or statute when developing its interpretation if 
the intentions of the Amendment or statute are not clear.
1
 When the text of a statute or other 
legislation is ambiguous, as in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, “the interpreter charged 
with determining the meaning of the ambiguous legal text must necessarily resort to sources 
outside the text itself.”2 
Sex-discrimination jurisprudence established by the United States Supreme Court in the 
decades after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment is not well-grounded in the 
legislative history from the Amendment. If the legislative history had been used by the Supreme 
                                                          
1
 See John Choon Yoo, Marshall's Plan: The Early Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 
1607, 1607-08 (1991-1992). 
2
 Michael F. Roessler, Mistaking Doubts and Qualms for Constitutional Law: Against the Rejection of Legislative 
History as a Tool of Legal Interpretation, 39 Sw.L.Rev. 103, 146 (2009). 
2 
 
Court when interpreting the application of the Fourteenth Amendment, it would have shown the 
documented discussions of “the legislators that considered, debated, and adopted ambiguous-
phrased texts [that outlined the] lengthy, nuanced discussions of just what [the Congress] was … 
doing when the law being interpreted by the judiciary was enacted or ratified.”3  
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution used terms 
and language that were purposefully ambiguous, which caused “argu[ments] and debate[s]” 
between Congressional members regarding “the Amendment’s meaning in the years immediately 
following its ratification.”4 Those documented historical debates and discussions between 
members of Congress helped establish “the idea that the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is not limited by the text of the Amendment,” but has an established “open-endedness” meant to 
act as a “guide [to] its interpretation and application.”5 Principle players involved in the framing 
of the Fourteenth Amendment spent years after its ratification reinforcing the concept that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ambiguous language extended the protection of fundamental rights for 
all citizens from not only the national government but also all the state governments.
6
 
Without the use of the legislative history from the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
guidance the Framers intentions would have implied, early Supreme Court sex-discrimination 
cases looked to draw parallel analysis to cases that changed public policy related to race issues. 
Ultimately, this thesis will argue that since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has not used legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to assist in the process of interpreting and applying the principles intended by the 
                                                          
3
 Roessler, supra note 2, at 146. 
4
 Id. at 141. 
5
 Id. 
6
 See generally Id. 
3 
 
Framers of the Amendment to the sex-discrimination cases that have been heard before it 
throughout the past 144 years of Supreme Court history. 
  
4 
 
Early Jurisprudence: From the Drafting and Ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to just before the Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Reed.
7
 
 
Established Supreme Court Jurisprudence calls for the use of Legislative History. 
According to well established United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court must look 
to the legislative history of a Constitutional Amendment or statute when developing its 
interpretation if the intentions of the Amendment or statute are not clear.
8
 Supreme Court 
Justices have relied on a “rich tradition of sources” to “guide and constrain interpretation” of the 
Constitution, “including pre- and post-enactment history.”9  
In his 1999 article published in the Harvard Journal on Legislation, Michael H. Koby 
stated that “[o]ne of the least controversial uses of legislative history” is when the courts 
“examine the intent of the drafters” of legislation in the process of “avoid[ing] an absurd 
[judicial] result.”10 Koby asserts that when, as in the Fourteenth Amendment, the text is 
ambiguous, “the interpreter charged with determining the meaning of the ambiguous legal text 
must necessarily resort to sources outside the text itself.”11 Koby continues his commentary by 
stating that, 
[O]ut of deference to the legislature and legislators that consider and adopt legal 
text pursuant to Article I or in deference to the national and state legislators that 
propose and ratify constitutional amendments, legislative history may also 
sometimes be determined to be a reliable tool of interpretation, as the legislators 
that considered, debated, and adopted ambiguous-phrased texts may have engaged 
                                                          
7
 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
8
 See Yoo, supra note 1, at 1607-08. 
9 
Jack M. Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, 11-24, (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. 
Siegel eds., 2009). 
10 
Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s 
Critique, 36 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 369, 375 (1999). 
11
 Roessler, supra note 2, at 145-146. 
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in lengthy, nuanced discussions of just what it was they were doing when the law 
being  interpreted by the judiciary was enacted or ratified.
12
 
 
Koby went on to include quotes from Abner Mikva, a judge and former member of 
Congress, stating that “the language of a statute may admittedly be vague, and therefore judges 
construing the enacted statute “‘cannot afford to ignore those obvious tools [such as legislative 
history] which members of Congress use to explain’” the process of legislative development and 
“’describe the meaning of the words used’” in the legislation.13 The language used by the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment must have been crafted to allow there to be a flexible 
understanding of its intent. “[T]he broader and more ambiguous language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,” writes Serena J. Hoy in her year 2000 article, “would seem to lend itself to more 
liberal interpretation.”14 The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution used terms and language that were purposefully ambiguous, which caused 
“argu[ments] and debate[s]” between Congressional members regarding “the Amendment’s 
meaning in the years immediately following its ratification.”15 Those documented historical 
debates and discussions between members of Congress helped establish “the idea that the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited by the text of the Amendment,” but has an 
established “open-endedness” meant to act as a “guide [to] its interpretation and application.”16 
As part of a post-ratification debate in the Forty-Second Congress of the United States, 
Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio supported his position that the Fourteenth Amendment, 
                                                          
12
 Id. at 146. 
13
 Koby, supra note 10. 
14
 Serena J. Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection: Congress, the Court, and the Civil Rights Acts, 16 J. L. & POLITICS 
381, 462 (2000). 
15
 Roessler, supra note 2, at 141. 
16
 Id. 
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which his involvement in its drafting played a “key role,” made “the first eight Amendments” or 
“the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.”17  
Rep. Bingham said: 
Mr. Speaker, that the scope and meaning of the limitations imposed by the first 
section, fourteenth amendment of the Constitution may be more fully understood, 
permit me to say that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a state, are chiefly defined in the 
first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
18
 
 
As the excerpt above shows, even the principal players involved in the framing of the 
Fourteenth Amendment spent years after its ratification reinforcing the concept that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ambiguous language extended the protection of fundamental rights for 
all citizens from not only the national government but also all the state governments.
19
 In reality 
however, the United States Supreme Court has been willing to only selectively incorporate 
pieces and parts of the Bill of Rights, and not in its entirety, to apply to the States over the last 
144 years since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371 (1823),
20
 United States Supreme Court Associate 
Justice Bushrod Washington was sitting as a Federal Circuit Court judge.
21
 In his opinion in the 
case, Justice Washington opined a sweeping description of the rights incorporated in Article IV, 
Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution; containing the language regarding the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States.
22
 Justice Washington used the case as an opportunity 
to refer to the definitional concepts of the fundamental rights encompassed in the privileges and 
                                                          
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. 
19
 See Id. 
20
 See generally Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371 (1823) 
21
 See Roessler, supra note 2, at 130-32. 
22
 See Id. 
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immunities clause of the Constitution.
23
 Justice Washington asked “what are the privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several States?”24 His answer was, they “are, in their nature 
fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free Governments.”25 Justice 
Washington explained that to list the all-encompassing “fundamental principles” in the privileges 
and immunities “would be perhaps more tedious than difficult to enumerate.”26 Justice 
Washington’s personal attempt to list the fundamental rights included the “protection by the 
government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of 
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety.”27 He wrote that these are “mentioned 
as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens . . . and the enjoyment of them by 
the citizens of each State, in every other State, was manifestly calculated.”28 
Representative Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio, Senator Arthur I. Boreman of West Virginia, 
and Representative George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, all said in post-ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment debates that Justice Washington’s “descriptions of the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship protected by Article IV also describe the scope of such privileges or 
immunities in the Fourteenth Amendment.”29 Representative James Monroe, a member of the 
Forty-Second Congress, explained that the Constitution’s interpretation, including the 
Fourteenth Amendment, should not be limited to those perceptions as they existed in the late 
1800’s.30  
                                                          
23
 See Id.  
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Id. at 131.   
30
 Id. at 136-137.   
8 
 
Representative Monroe said,  
[I]n time, new circumstances will arise, new social conditions appear, and minds 
will then be found who will propose to include the new phenomena under the old 
rule. This will startle many as an innovation, as a violation of the constitution, 
whereas it may only be the application of known and admitted principles to new 
circumstances. From the nature of things the field to which constitutional law may 
be applied will constantly change or be enlarged, and we must not confound this 
natural expansion with a violation of the instrument itself.
31
 
 
These documented assertions found in the legislative history, made by Congressional 
lawmakers regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, requested that future legislators and jurists 
look at the Constitution as a pronouncement of fundamental rights whose list was expansive and 
expandable. Those requests, and the legislative history that proves them, were not referred to by 
the Justices of the Supreme Court in their decisions as the decades have gone by since the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
“[F]ormer Representative John M. Broomall,” a framer of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
“assumed [] that equality in civil rights was guaranteed to women by the Amendment.”32 When 
Mr. Broomall was “[a]t the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1872–1873,” he 
expressed his beliefs regarding the rights of women when he said, 
Four hundred years ago women, according to the popular notion of that day, had 
no souls … Still later than that, the women were beasts of burden … Still the 
world moves, and in our time they have been granted equal civil rights with men. 
The next step is coming, and there are those living who will see it … That step is 
equality of all human beings both before the law and in the making of the law. 
Thus it is that the world moves, and the man who is not prepared to keep 
pace with its motion had better get out of the way.
33
 
 
                                                          
31
 Id. at 137.   
32
 Steven G. Calabresi & Juli T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 56 (2011). 
33
 Id. at 56-57. 
9 
 
Representatives James Monroe and John M. Broomall, and many other Fourteenth 
Amendment framers like them, it appears, “believed that equal political rights would make 
women the complete equals of men under the law.”34 And that “[e]qual political rights would 
necessarily mean equal civil rights.”35 But the Fourteenth Amendment’s “Section 1 is premised 
on the idea that all citizens enjoy equal civil rights which it calls ‘privileges’ or ‘immunities.’”36 
“The Fifteenth Amendment establishe[d] that a subset of citizens with equal civil rights,” which 
were white and African-American men, “enjoy[ed] equal political rights like the right to vote in 
addition to equal civil rights.”37 With this concept in mind, it stands to reason that “[p]olitical 
rights are … harder to get than civil rights.”38 
Bradwell v. Illinois (1873).
39
 Post-ratification Fourteenth Amendment United States 
Supreme Court sex-discrimination jurisprudence began in 1873 with the Court decision in 
Bradwell v. Illinois. Myra Bradwell brought her case as a “challenge [to] an Illinois law that 
prohibited women from practicing law.”40 Ms. Bradwell’s attorney presented the question to the 
Court; “’Can a female citizen, duly qualified in respect of age, character, and learning, claim, 
under the fourteenth amendment, the privilege of earning a livelihood by practicing at the bar of 
a judicial court?’”41 In the majority opinion for the Supreme Court, Justice Miller stated,  
In regard to [The Fourteenth] [A]mendment[,] counsel for the plaintiff… says that 
there are certain privileges and immunities which belong to a citizen of the United 
States… , and he proceeds to argue that admission to the bar of a State of a person 
                                                          
34
 Id. at 57. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas P. Stabile, Symposium: The Second Founding: On Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1431, 1443-1444 (2009). 
37
 Id. at 1444. [emphasis added] 
38
 Id. at 1443-1444. 
39
 Bradwell v. The State of Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).   
40
 Calabresi, supra note 32, at 60.   
41
 Id. 
10 
 
who possesses the requisite learning and character is one of those which a State 
may not deny. In this latter proposition we are not able to concur with counsel.
42
 
  
Ms. Bradwell’s attorney argued that even though “[t]he legislature may say at what age 
candidates shall be admitted [to the bar]” and may also “elevate or depress the standard of 
learning required” for a license to practice law, “a qualification, to which a whole class of 
citizens never can attain, is not a regulation of admission to the bar, but is, as to such citizens, a 
prohibition.”43 Counsel for Bradwell went on to say, 
If the [Illinois] legislature may, under the preten[s]e of fixing qualifications, 
declare that no female citizen shall be permitted to practice law, it may as well 
declare that no colored citizen shall practice law; for the provision in the 
Constitution of the United States which secures to colored male citizens the 
privileges of admission to the bar, or the pursuit of the other ordinary avocations 
of life, is the provision that ‘no State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of a citizen.’”44 
 
As powerful as those words may have been, they did not sway the Court. Justice Miller 
responded to Bradwell’s attorney directly in the Court’s opinion by stating, “[w]e agree with him 
that there are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States, in that relation 
and character, and that it is these and these alone which a State is forbidden to abridge. But the 
right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not one of them.”45 The Court did stop 
short of “reasoning that women were not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”46 Although 
the brief opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Miller, the revealing language that 
expressed what this author believes was the true sentiment of the Court is contained in the 
concurring opinion delivered by Justice Bradley. 
                                                          
42
 Bradwell, supra note 39, at 138-39.   
43
 Calabresi, supra note 32, at 60.   
44
 Id.  
45
 Bradwell, supra note 39, at 139.   
46
 Calabresi, supra note 32, at 60. 
11 
 
Associate Justice Bradley began his concurring opinion by acknowledging the fact that 
Myra Bradwell was “a married woman.”47 Justice Bradley continued his analysis by stating that 
Ms. Bradwell’s claim “assumes” that “women as citizens” have the right “under the fourteenth 
amendment of the Constitution … to engage in any and every profession, occupation, or 
employment in civil life.”48 Justice Bradley states that the “natural and proper timidity and 
delicacy” of women makes them unfit “for many of the occupations of civil life.”49 This author 
believes if Susan B. Anthony would have had the opportunity, she would have delivered quite a 
strong contrary rebuttal to Justice Bradley’s remarks regarding women’s overall fitness for civil 
life. 
As the concurring opinion continued, Justice Bradley stated it was the “constitution of the 
family” and the “harmony” which was “founded in [its] divine ordinance” that would be 
“repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her 
husband.”50 But it was a common law incapacity for a married woman to make contracts 
“without her husband’s consent” that Justice Bradley used to fundamentally justify why women 
could not “perform the duties and trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and counselor.”51 
Justice Bradley concluded his opinion by reasoning that it is “[t]he paramount destiny and 
mission of woman [] to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of 
the Creator.”52 It is not clear from Justice Bradley’s dicta if he felt that the “law of the Creator”53 
                                                          
47
 Bradwell, supra note 39, at 140.   
48
 Id.   
49
 Id.   
50
 Id. at 141.   
51
 Id.   
52
 Id.   
53
 Id.   
12 
 
trumped the Supreme law of the land. Additionally, nowhere in the opinion offered by the Court 
is there any reference to the legislative history of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
According to the Supreme Court Historical Society web site, the Justices that were sitting 
on the bench of the Supreme Court for the 1872 – 1873 session to hear Bradwell v. Illinois were 
all born between 1803 and 1816.
54
 Specifically, Justices Clifford (1803), Swayne (1804), and 
Strong (1808), were all born when Thomas Jefferson was President.
55
 Remarkably, these Justices 
were born only a few short years after President George Washington’s death in 1799.56 Justice 
Clifford was born a mere 27 years after independence was declared from England in 1776. The 
remaining Justices on the Court were all born within the presidency of James Madison, another 
colonial Founding Father. The significance this author is attempting to allude to is the fact that 
the era in which these Justices were reared was squarely in the shadow of the Founding Fathers 
of the United States of America; a group that had come to power through the writing of the 
Declaration of Independence in the generation before the sitting Supreme Court of 1873. There 
can be no doubt that their Colonial-American upbringing played an integral role in the Justices’ 
mindset when they were establishing the earliest Supreme Court sex-discrimination doctrine. 
Unfortunately for Ms. Bradwell, and the rest of America’s women, the Supreme Court Justices, 
raised by colonial fathers from the Eighteenth Century, could not see into the future where the 
year 1900 A.D. and the Twentieth Century lie only a scant 26 years ahead. 
Early Indications: The Fourteenth Amendment and its Potential Impacts. In the days 
and months leading up to the passing of the Fourteenth Amendment in Congress, bits and pieces 
                                                          
54
 See "The Supreme Court Historical Society - Home." N.p., n.d. Web. 09 July 2012. Found at 
http://www.supremecourthistory.org 
55
 See Id. 
56
 See "George Washington." The White House. N.p., n.d. Web. 09 July 2012. Found at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/georgewashington 
13 
 
of the Amendment were circulated through media outlets of the time, like newspapers and other 
periodical publications. These releases gave the post-Civil War citizenry a glimpse at what 
would become the Fourteenth Amendment. Once the full document was ratified, women’s 
groups, like the National Woman’s Suffrage Association, began to “claim the right to vote” 
based on the belief that the “new constitutional amendment” entitled women to vote “under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.”57 The National Woman’s Suffrage Association (NWSA) 
leadership headed by the now legendary Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 
“petitioned Congress for a Section Five statute declaring that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protected women’s right to vote.”58 At the same time that NWSA leadership was working on the 
United States Congress for legislative action regarding women’s enfranchisement into the 
political system, “women across the nation engaged in civil-disobedience voting” in an effort to 
“produce test-case constitutional litigation.”59 This strategy ultimately led to the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Minor v. Happersett in 1875.
60
 
Minor v. Happersett (1875).
61
 It had been “[t]wo years [][since] the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bradwell” when the Court, in Minor v. Happersett, ruled on “whether women ha[d] 
the right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment.”62 Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion 
for the Supreme Court in Happersett.
63
 In the Court’s opinion, Chief Justice Waite chose to first 
                                                          
57
 Reva B. Siegel, Social Movements and Law Reform: Text in Contest: Gender and The Constitution from a Social 
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 334-335 (2001).   
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. at 335.   
60
 Id.   
61
 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875). 
62
 Calabresi, supra note 32, at 60.   
63
 Happersett, 88 U.S. at 162. 
14 
 
address whether “women have always been considered as citizens the same as men.”64 Chief 
Justice Waite wrote that the “abundant proof” as to women’s citizenry “is to be found in the 
legislative and judicial history of the country.” 65 The Court’s opinion stated that Mrs. Minor 
“has always been a citizen [of the United States] from her birth, and entitled to all the privileges 
and immunities of citizenship.”66 
Attorneys for Mrs. Virginia Minor “argued the restrictions on women’s suffrage violated 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause[]”67 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Waite wrote in 
the Court’s Happersett opinion that if suffrage was a “privilege[] of a citizen of the United 
States[,]” set out in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution, then “[t]he direct 
question is, therefore, presented whether all citizens are necessarily voters.”68 Chief Justice 
Waite stated that “[t]he Constitution does not define the privileges and immunities of citizens.”69 
He wrote that to find “that definition we must look elsewhere[,]” but “[i]n this case we need not 
determine what they are, but only whether suffrage is necessarily one of them.”70 
In the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Waite stated that “the Constitution has not added 
the right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizen[,] … [i]t simply furnished an 
additional guaranty for the protection of such as he already had.”71 From that point in the 
opinion, Chief Justice Waite embarked on a lengthy discussion and testimonial of the history of 
                                                          
64
 Id. at 169. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. at 170. 
67
 Samantha Barbas, Symposium on Gender, Parenting, and the Law: Note: Dorothy Kenyon and the Making of 
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voter laws established in the original colonies of the United States.
72
 Justice Waite stated in the 
Court’s opinion that they were then seeking to ascertain the intentions of the Framers of the 
Constitution as it related to whether or not they “intended to make all citizens of the United 
States voters.”73 Justice Waite stated “if it had been intended to make all citizens of the United 
States voters, the framers of the Constitution would [] have … [made it] expressly declared.”74  
Even though Chief Justice Waite acknowledged in the Court’s opinion that the Court 
researched the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitution through 
“legislative and judicial history,”75 and how they “must look elsewhere”76 for the defined 
privileges and immunities, and that considerations “outside [the Constitution] is equally 
effective[,]”77 an analysis of the legislative history of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is conspicuously missing. 
Ultimately, “the Court in Minor v. Happersett did not deny that women’s civil rights were 
equally protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” but ruled that the Constitution did not 
guarantee any citizens’ “right to vote because the Amendment protected only civil and not 
political rights.”78 In reaction to the Happersett ruling, the National Woman’s Suffrage 
Association (NWSA) “began to pursue a constitutional amendment.”79 Even though “Congress 
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initially appeared receptive to the Amendment, [] the movement did not secure its ratification for 
another three decades.”80 
Muller v. Oregon (1908).
81
 Thirty-three years after the decision in Happersett, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), a labor case. As was the case in 
Muller, “a number of laws effectively excluded women from traditionally male jobs.”82 The 
appellant in the case, the owner of a laundry, was criminally cited for allowing female employees 
to work longer than was permitted under an Oregon state statute.
83
 The laundry owner argued 
that the law that restricted the hours of labor allowable by females violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution.
84
 “[I]n the name of ‘protecting’ [][women] from supposedly sex-
specific harms[,]” laws were enacted and upheld that “limit[ed] their hours and time of work, and 
[] regulat[ed] other conditions of employment.”85 
Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the Court in Muller stating that “[t]he single 
question [of the case] is the constitutionality of the statute … as it affects the work of a female in 
a laundry.”86 Justice Brewer chose to “put[] to one side the elective franchise[]” for women in his 
analysis of the Oregon statute while acknowledging that according to Oregon law a woman’s 
“personal and contractual rights [] stand on the same plane as the other sex.”87 This is a quite 
progressive stance for the State of Oregon since U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Bradley’s 
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concurring opinion in Bradwell, in which he basically said for a married woman to make 
contracts “without her husband’s consent”88 was impermissible under “the law of the Creator.”89 
Attorneys for the laundry owner in Muller argued that under the Fourteenth Amendment 
“th[e] law interfered with [the] constitutional rights of liberty of contract previously established 
for men[,]”90 “under the rule of Lochner v. New York.”91 Justice Brewer stated in the Court’s 
opinion that it was due to a “woman’s physical structure and the performance of [her] maternal 
functions” that warranted the Court’s denial of women’s “general right to contract” that the 
Court had previously protected for men in Lochner.
92
 Justice Brewer stated that the reason the 
Court opted to deny women the same rights the Court afforded men was “not merely [due to] her 
own health, but the well-being of the race – justify[ing] [the] legislation to protect her from the 
greed as well as the passion of man.”93 Justice Brewer states in the opinion that “history 
discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man[,]”94 but nowhere in the 
opinion is mentioned the legislative history regarding the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923).95 The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in 
another labor case, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), in which the significance 
of this case was that it was “the first sex discrimination case to be decided by the Supreme Court 
following the adoption of the [Nineteenth] Amendment in 1920.”96 Although this case was 
decided through the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and not the 
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Fourteenth Amendment, the sex-discrimination jurisprudence established in this case bears 
analysis.  Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority in Adkins, referenced the previously 
decided Muller case in which the Court had used “the fact that historically woman has always 
been dependent upon man,” and that man has “established his control [over woman] by superior 
physical strength.”97 Justice Sutherland went on the state: 
But the ancient inequality of the sexes, otherwise than physical, as suggested in 
the Muller Case has continued “with diminishing intensity.” In view of the great – 
not to say revolutionary – changes which have taken place since that utterance, in 
the contractual, political and civil status of women, culminating in the Nineteenth 
Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say that these differences have now come 
almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point.
98
 
These words by Justice Sutherland are substantial. Justice Sutherland said that the Court 
could no longer “accept the doctrine that women of mature age … may be subjected to 
restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case of men 
under similar circumstances.”99 Although Justice Sutherland and “[t]he majority in Adkins [] 
premised [their decision] on the idea that after 1920, sex discrimination was, as a constitutional 
matter, a form of caste[,]”100 not every member of the Court was ready to embrace the idea. In 
their dissent, “Justice Holmes and Chief Justice Taft both denied that the Nineteenth Amendment 
should have any effect on the constitutional analysis.”101 And, with Justice Holmes holding stern 
to traditional beliefs of women, he stated in the dissent that “’[i]t will need more than the 
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Nineteenth Amendment to convince me that there are no differences between men and women, 
or that legislation cannot take those differences into account.’”102 
It is not disputed, in the earlier United States Supreme Courts or in the modern Courts, that 
Congress regularly “delegate[d] the drafting of statutory text in its chambers, its conferences, and 
its committees.”103 These meetings and sessions can be found and used by the Court by accessing 
Congress’s legislative history. “The Supreme Court began using legislative history in 1860.”104 
The time period of the New Deal legislation in the 1930s and the Supreme Court’s  
“overthrow of the “’plain meaning rule’” ushered in “the modern era of fuller, more accurate use 
of legislative history.”105 But as we will see, the use of Fourteenth Amendment legislative history 
on sex-discrimination cases is remarkably absent. 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937).
106
 In the forty plus years following the ratification 
of the Nineteenth Amendment and the decision in Adkins, the United States Supreme Court ruled 
on three sex-discrimination cases; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937), Goesaert v. Cleary 
(1948), and Hoyt v. Florida (1961). First, the labor case between Elsie Parrish and her former 
employer, West Coast Hotel Company, was heard by the Court in December of 1936 and 
decided in March of 1937.
107
 In the majority opinion, Justice Hughes opined that the Supreme 
Court of the State of Washington properly upheld that the State of Washington statute 
establishing a minimum wage for women “invoked principles long established by [] [the United 
                                                          
102
 Id. 
103
 Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 212 
(2000). 
104
 Id. 
105
 Id. at 212-213. 
106
 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish et al, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
107
 See Id. 
20 
 
States Supreme] Court in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment.”108 The appellant in the 
case, West Coast Hotel Company, “relie[d] upon the decision of th[e] Court in Adkins v. 
Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, which held invalid the District of Columbia Minimum Wage 
Act, which was attacked under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”109 Justice 
Hughes stated in the opinion that the State of Washington’s “legislature was entitled” to enact a 
statute that addressed “the evils of the “’sweating system,’” [and] the exploiting of workers at 
wages so low as to be insufficient to meet the bare cost of living.”110 Justice Hughes went on to 
state that the fact that other states in the Union had adopted “similar requirements” as the State of 
Washington statute amounted to “a deepseated conviction” nationally to address poverty for 
women; and concluded that the “[l]egislative response” by the State of Washington “[could] 
[]not be regarded as arbitrary or capricious.”111  
Even though it may be accepted today that contemporary labor laws protect the rights of 
employees, in the early to mid-1930s the Supreme Court of the United States’ jurisprudence 
regarding the right to contract appeared firmly entrenched. This author perceives the majority’s 
opinion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, in a patriarchal protectionist stance; as still viewing 
women as a class of citizens that needed protection stemming from long held views of women’s 
inability to compete with men. Justice Hughes stated that “[w]hat can be closer to the public 
interest than the health of women and their protection from unscrupulous and overreaching 
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employers?”112 A gender-neutral law protecting both men and women from “unscrupulous … 
employers” would have been more appropriate.113 
As part of the West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish dissent, Justice Sutherland forwarded his 
views still fresh in his mind from the majority opinion in Adkins.
114
 With the Lochner doctrine 
echoing in his dissent, Justice Sutherland still manages to advocate for the rising tide of the 
rights of women and how they are becoming more equal to men.
115
  
Justice Sutherland wrote, 
The common-law rules restricting the power of women to make contracts have, 
under our system, long since practically disappeared. Women today stand upon a 
legal and political equality with men. There is no longer any reason why they 
should be put in different classes in respect of their legal right to make contracts; 
nor should they be denied, in effect, the right to compete with men for work 
paying lower wages which men may be willing to accept.
116
 
 
Essentially, Justice Sutherland was saying that if women wanted to work for wages that did 
not earn them enough money to afford life’s basic necessities alongside of men, consequently, 
the Lochner doctrine afforded them that right.
117
 In principle, Justice Sutherland argued for an 
economic equality for women to work in poverty, but it was at least a measure of equality, 
nonetheless. Both Justice Hughes and Justice Sutherland cited to previous Supreme Court cases 
upholding principles from the Fourteenth Amendment, but neither opinion cited to, or quoted 
from, the legislative history of the Amendment itself. 
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Goesaert v. Cleary (1948).
118
 As is the case in life and nature, everything has a retreat of 
sorts from time to time. The decision in Goesaert v. Cleary (1948) marks a clear step backwards 
regarding the forward progression of United States Supreme Court sex-discrimination 
jurisprudence.
119
 In the majority opinion of an 6-3 decision, Justice Frankfurter stated that the 
issue before the Court was whether “Michigan can[] forbid females generally from being 
barmaids and at the same time make an exception in favor of the wives and daughters of the 
owners of liquor establishments.”120 In Justice Frankfurter’s rational analysis of the case through 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he states that the “Constitution in 
enjoining the equal protection of the laws upon States precludes irrational discrimination as 
between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law[,]”121 but he adds the caveat that 
“[t]he Fourteenth Amendment did not tear history up by the roots.”122 
Justice Frankfurter writes in the Goesaert v. Cleary majority opinion that “despite the vast 
changes in the social and legal position of women … [t]he Constitution does not require [State] 
legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards” and, additionally, States 
have the right to “draw[] a sharp line between the sexes.”123 Justice Frankfurter and the majority 
sided with the State of Michigan’s patriarchal belief “that the oversight assured through 
ownership of a bar by a barmaid’s husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront a 
barmaid without such protecting oversight.”124 
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Alternatively, Justice Rutledge’s sharp, but concise, dissent begins with the statement that 
“the equal protection clause ... require[s] lawmakers to refrain from invidious distinctions.”125 
Justice Rutledge goes on to write that although “[a] male owner” may be “absent from his bar, 
[he] may employ his wife and daughter as barmaids. [But] [a] female owner may neither work as 
a barmaid herself nor employ her daughter in that position.”126 In language that will be echoed in 
Reed v. Reed some 23 years later, Justice Rutledge stated, 
[T]here could be no [] conceivable justification for … [a] statute [that] arbitrarily 
discriminates between male and female [bar] owners … [due to] a legislative 
solicitude for the moral and physical well-being of women, but for the law, would 
be employed as barmaids.
127
 
   
Although Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge chose to not cite to any Fourteenth 
Amendment legislative history within the Court’s majority and dissenting opinions in Goesaert v. 
Cleary, the Supreme Court had used legislative history in rendering its Court decisions in the 
relatively recent past. Use of legislative history became increasingly necessary by the Court due 
to “changes in the nature of statutes” brought on “by New Deal legislation.”128 “For example, in 
1941, the Supreme Court made use of legislative history to interpret the word “’hire’” under the 
National Labor Relations Act.”129 Later, in 1944, “the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of 
“’public utility’” as used in the Emergency Price Control Act in part by relying on House 
committee hearings.”130 Although it is difficult to predict an alternate outcome in every case, it is 
the contention of this author that had the Supreme Court of the United States used the legislative 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment when conducting its analyses of sex-discrimination cases, 
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the intent of at least some of the framers to extend to women the plethora of rights found within 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, along with new meaning to the Equal Protection and Due 
Process clauses, would have been recognized and taken more into consideration as part of the 
Court’s decision making process. 
Hoyt v. Florida (1961).
131
 In 1961, the Court rendered its decision in Hoyt v. Florida.
132
 
Justice Harlan submitted the unanimous opinion for the Court that considered whether Mrs. 
Gwendolyn Hoyt’s second degree murder “trial before an all-male jury violated rights assured by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”133 Mrs. Hoyt’s claim stated that the all-male jury selected for her 
second degree murder trial was an unconstitutional “product of a state jury statute which works 
[to the] … exclusion of women from jury service.”134 Justice Harlan started the opinion by first 
addressing the challenge that the statute was unconstitutional on its face.
135
 
Justice Harlan wrote, 
We of course recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment reaches not only arbitrary 
class exclusions from jury service based on race or color, but also all other 
exclusions which “single out” any class of persons “for different treatment not 
based on some reasonable classification.
136
 
  
Justice Harlan chose to focus the Court’s rational basis opinion hinging on whether the 
exemption of women from registering for jury duty amounted to an “exclusionary device.”137 
Justice Harlan stated that “the relevant inquiry is whether the exemption itself is based on some 
reasonable classification and whether the manner in which it is exercisable rests on some rational 
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foundation.”138 Justice Harlan and the unanimous Court ruled that the statute did rest on a 
rational basis.
139
 Justice Harlan wrote that the State of Florida statute was “acting in pursuit of 
the general welfare” and that due to a woman’s “own special responsibilities[,]” she “should be 
relieved from the civic duty of jury service” unless “she herself determines” otherwise.140 The 
“special responsibilities” that Justice Harlan wrote about were due to the fact the Court opined 
that a “woman is still regarded as the center of [the] home and family life.”141 This finding by the 
Court in 1961 was in spite of “the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and 
protections of bygone years.”142 
Justice Harlan, in the Hoyt opinion for the Court, wrote that the instant “case in no way 
resemble[d] those [cases] involving race or color” and that “neither the unfortunate atmosphere 
of ethnic or racial prejudices … nor the long course of discriminatory administrative practice[s]” 
were present.
143
 This author believes that the Court used language in the Hoyt opinion like 
“enlightened emancipation of women”144 specifically due to the nearly 100 years of Supreme 
Court sanctioned “discriminatory administrative practice[s].”145 As has been the case to this 
point in the establishment of sex-discrimination jurisprudence by the Court, Justice Harlan did 
not use legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment in the opinion. 
Throughout the decade between the Court’s decision in Hoyt and the decision in Reed v. 
Reed, the challenge “was essentially to get the Court to see the problem[]” with sex-
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discrimination.
146
 The Warren Court of the 1960s “steadfastly refused applications to review a 
number of cases in which state and lower federal courts had upheld official discrimination 
against women.”147 National Organization of Women attorney Mary Eastwood, in 1967, 
“advised her organization that pursuing constitutional change through both lawmaking and 
adjudication might serve … the movement and strengthen its case.”148 Speaking about the Equal 
Rights Amendment to the Constitution, Ms. Eastwood said, 
Even if the ERA fails to pass, vigorously pushing for it now will show women are 
demanding equal rights and responsibilities under the law by the most drastic 
legal means possible – a constitutional amendment. The effect, provided we make 
clear we think [the] 14
th
 [amendment] properly interpreted should give women 
[the] same unqualified protection, would be to improve our chances of winning 
the 14
th
 amendment cases.
149
 
 
Modern Supreme Court sex-discrimination jurisprudence has been established through 
using an analogous doctrine to race-discrimination.
150
 By using “the concept of the 
“’stereotype’” that the civil rights movement” employed during the 1960s, feminists “explain[ed] 
why laws distinguishing between men and women did not rationally reflect differences in the 
family roles[,]” like those cited in the decision in Hoyt, “but instead inflicted constitutionally 
cognizable harm on “’individuals.’”151 Future Supreme Court Justice, Professor Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, then a “young law professor[,] [was] chosen by the ACLU” to write the brief for the 
appellant in Reed v. Reed.
152
 In her brief, Professor Ginsburg “honed the race/sex analogy into an 
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argument for applying to sex-based state action the same strict scrutiny the Court had recently 
begun to apply to race-based state action.”153 “Notwithstanding the power of the civil rights 
movement in the 1960s, there were important differences between race and sex classifications – 
points of disanalogy that haunt sex discrimination law to this day.”154 Still, the continued 
effectiveness of current sex-discrimination jurisprudence relies on “the race/gender analogy to 
deflect attention from” the fallacies regarding the legislative “history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”155 
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Cases decided during the Chief Justice Warren Burger Court 
 
Burger Court Cases from 1971 – 1980 
 
Reed v. Reed (1971).
156
 In its landmark sex-discrimination decision in Reed v. Reed, 404 
U.S. 71 (1971), the United States Supreme Court ruled for the first time that, under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, States could not enact legislation that placed a 
“mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other.”157 The Court did 
acknowledge “that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat 
different classes of persons in different ways;”158 but the distinction the Court found in Reed was 
that the Equal Protection Clause did not afford a State the right to “legislate [] different 
treatment … [of] persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly 
unrelated to the objective of that statute.”159  
As part of its Reed decision, the Court cited to a 1920 United States Supreme Court 
decision, Royster v. Virginia, 253 US 412 (1920), which gave rise to the rational basis language, 
when the Court said “a classification “‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon 
some ground or difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so 
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”160 The Court in Reed, for the 
first time in United States Supreme Court history, ruled a statute unconstitutional through the 
application of a rational basis test for sex-discrimination stating that the differences between 
males and females in the United States of America did not cause them to be dissimilarly 
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circumstanced for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Unfortunately, the Court in Reed did not seek to undo past sex-discrimination jurisprudence by 
identifying any particular cases to overturn, nor did the Reed Court cite to any Fourteenth 
Amendment legislative history in its reasoning.
161
  
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed, a flurry of 19 cases regarding sex-
discrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were heard by the Court in the seven 
years up to and including 1980. This is significant because the Court was only willing to hear a 
total of seven cases from 1873 – 1971, a span of almost 100 years. Although our focus in this 
thesis is on Fourteenth Amendment cases, some notable Fifth Amendment cases will also be 
covered. 
Frontiero v. Richardson (1973).
162
 The case of Frontiero v. Richardson, decided in 1973, 
was not based on the Fourteenth Amendment due to the fact that the issue stemmed from a 
member of the United States Air Force in a suit over family benefits provided by the Air 
Force.
163
 Although this case does not come under the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment, it 
does arguably represent “the high-water mark in the [Supreme] Court’s treatment of sex 
discrimination.”164 Justice Brennan wrote for the four justice plurality opinion of the Court. 
Justice Powell delivered a concurring opinion with two other Justices in agreement with his 
opinion. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. The appellant, Lieutenant Sharron Frontiero had 
sought an increase in “quarters allowances, and housing and medical benefits for her husband … 
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on the ground that he was her “‘dependent.’”165 The fringe benefits were established by Congress 
“[i]n an effort to attract career personnel through reenlistment.”166 “Although such benefits 
would automatically have been granted to the wife of a male member[,]” Mrs. Frontiero’s 
“application was denied” because she was forced to prove her husband’s dependency.167 It was 
believed at the time, that because “99% of all the members of the uniformed services [were] 
male,” the government stood to realize a “considerable saving of administrative expense and 
manpower” by only forcing female service-members to prove their spouses dependency.168 
Justice Brennan and Powell ruled in their separate opinions that the Congressional statutes were 
discriminatory on the basis of sex in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.
169
 
What causes this case to stand out at this moment in time was how Justice Brennan, and 
the other three justices who joined him, opined that this case should move the classification of 
gender to a “suspect” class and have strict scrutiny applied in all future cases.170 For the first time 
in the history of the Supreme Court, an opinion admitted that “[t]here can be no doubt that our 
Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”171 Justice Brennan wrote 
that a “[t]raditional[] … attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ … [has] in [] effect, put women, not 
on a pedestal, but in a cage.”172 Justice Brennan went on to point out the concurring opinion in 
Bradwell v. Illinois by Justice Bradley as evidence of the “unfortunate history of sex 
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discrimination.”173 Referring to Justice Bradley’s Bradwell concurring opinion, Justice Brennan 
said, 
As a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually became laden 
with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout 
much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many 
respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.
174
 
 
Also for the first time in the history of the United States Supreme Court, an opinion held 
that “sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the 
accident of birth.”175 Justice Brennan made note that “over the [previous] decade, Congress ha[d] 
itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications[,]”176 and that due to the 
increased sensitivity, “Congress itself ha[d] concluded that classifications based upon sex are 
inherently invidious,” and that the “conclusion of a coequal branch of Government” 177 was 
significant and an important consideration of the Court in the development of its opinion in the 
instant case. Justice Brennan, representing the four members of the plurality opinion, held that 
“classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, 
are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.”178 Oddly 
enough, Justice Brennan in the plurality opinion did refer to “legislative history” 179 from the 
Congress of the United States; but, alas, it was from research into the United States Code statutes 
dealing with the Armed Forces fringe benefits and not the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.  
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Sex-discrimination being elevated to strict scrutiny was only one vote away from 
becoming the majority opinion in Frontiero, and therefore, the law of the land; and that vote 
most likely would have come from Justice Powell. In the three member concurring opinion 
written by Justice Powell, the challenged statute was held to be unconstitutional in violation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but Justice Powell felt it unnecessary to elevate 
“classifications based on sex” to strict judicial scrutiny.180 Justice Powell had two reasons for not 
raising gender to a suspect class. His first rationale for this decision was a belief that the recent 
decision in Reed v. Reed held the sufficient rational support to overturn the challenged statutes 
without “add[ing] sex to the narrowly limited group of classifications which are inherently 
suspect.”181 His second rationale was “because he felt that such a statement was more 
appropriately left to the Equal Rights Amendment.”182 
“The Equal Rights Amendment,” Justice Powell wrote, “which if adopted will resolve the 
substance of this precise question, has been approved by the Congress and submitted for 
ratification by the States.”183 Justice Powell stated that he felt that the “traditional democratic 
process” was underway and that he did not want the Court to act “prematurely” in elevating 
gender to a suspect class, giving deference and the “appropriate respect for [the] duly prescribed 
legislative process.”184 Ultimately, the Equal Rights Amendment as of yet has not been ratified 
by the States, and an opportunity was missed when “the book was closed on the Powell opinion 
as a statement against strict scrutiny for gender.”185 “[U]niformly accepted gender classifications 
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such as single-sex bathrooms[] … and locker rooms[,]” along with a “fear of military draft on 
women” ultimately “led to the defeat of the ERA.”186 Perhaps if Justice Brennan had “articulated 
a [strict scrutiny] standard that required [a more] meaningful judicial review of means and 
ends[,]”187 his opinion in Frontiero would have garnered more support within the Court.  
Kahn v. Shevin (1974).
188
 With the opinion from Frontiero fresh in the minds of the 
Court, the next case to be heard was Kahn v. Shevin in 1974; Justice Douglas delivered the 
majority opinion for the Court.
189
 Mr. Kahn, a widower and a citizen of Florida, had brought suit 
against the State of Florida because he believed widowers should be entitled to the same $500.00 
tax exemption as widows are afforded, and that his denial by the Dade County Tax Assessor’s 
Office was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
190
 
In his opinion, Justice Douglas wrote that “[t]here can be no dispute that the financial 
difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or in any other State exceed those facing the 
man.”191 Justice Douglas did acknowledge the struggles facing women in America at the time by 
stating that “[w]hether from overt discrimination” in employment stemming from a “male-
dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid 
jobs.”192 Justice Douglas continued by stating that although a “widower can usually continue in 
the occupation” he had prior to his wife’s death, alternatively, “the widow will find herself 
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suddenly forced in a[n] [unfamiliar] job market … [and] because of her former economic 
dependency [on her deceased husband], she will have fewer skills to offer.”193  
In application of his rational basis test, Justice Douglas stated that “Florida’s differing 
treatment of widows and widowers “’rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the legislation[,]’” citing to a quote used in Reed from 
Royster.
194
 The State tax law was “reasonably designed[,]” wrote Justice Douglas, in furtherance 
of “the state policy of cushioning the financial impact … upon the sex for which th[e] loss 
imposes a disproportionately heavy burden.”195 “Gender has never been rejected as an 
impermissible classification in all instances[,]” wrote Justice Douglas; and to cap off an almost 
complete digression away from the plurality opinion in Frontiero, Justice Douglas chose to end 
his opinion by quoting Chief Justice Hughes in the 1908 decision in Muller v. Oregon, in which 
the Chief Justice stated that the Fourteenth Amendment “imposes no iron rule of equality, 
prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to schemes of taxation … [and] to hold 
otherwise would be to subject the essential taxing power of the State to an intolerable 
supervision.”196 Although Justice Douglas quoted and cited to sex-discrimination cases like Reed 
and Muller, he did not cite to, nor did he quote from, legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Obviously frustrated with the decision from Justice Douglas and the majority, Justice 
Brennan’s dissent rails against “a legislative classification that distinguishes potential 
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beneficiaries solely by reference to their gender-based status.”197 As in Frontiero, Justice 
Brennan argues that a “close judicial scrutiny” is warranted for “gender-based classifications 
[that] too often have been inexcusably utilized to stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless 
segments of society.”198 Justice Brennan’s vehement insistence that there are “readily available” 
gender-neutral or narrowly tailored alternatives at the disposal of the State of Florida 
unfortunately fell on the deaf ears of the majority.”199 As was the case in Frontiero, Justice 
Brennan did not use Fourteenth Amendment legislative history to make his case for invalidating 
the constitutionally challenged Florida statute. 
Geduldig v. Aiello (1974).
200
 During the same 1974 Supreme Court session that had heard 
Kahn v. Shevin, the case of Geduldig v. Aiello was decided. This time, Justice Stewart wrote the 
opinion for the majority.
201
 The case was brought by four California women who believed that 
the State of California mandated “disability insurance system” that “exclude[d] from coverage 
certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy … violate[d] the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”202 As part of his rational analysis of the California employment 
disability insurance program, Justice Stewart acknowledged that “California [] created a program 
to insure most risks of employment disability, it has not chosen to insure all such risks.”203 
Justice Stewart continued by insisting that “[t]his Court has held that, consistently with the Equal 
Protection Clause, a State may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the problem … 
select[ing] one phase of one field and apply[ing] a remedy there, [while] neglecting the others 
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…”204 And he added that “’[t]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must 
choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.’”205 In 
upholding the program and holding the women’s contention invalid, Justice Stewart wrote that 
“although [the appellee] has received insurance protection equivalent to that provided all other 
participating employees,” the appellee invalidly feels that she “has suffered discrimination 
because she encountered a risk that was outside the program’s protection.”206 Although Justice 
Stewart referred to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment numerous times in 
his opinion, he did not refer to recent Supreme Court sex-discrimination cases or legislative 
history of the Amendment. 
Once again, Justice Brennan delivered a dissenting opinion chastising the majority for not 
using a higher standard than a rational basis. Oddly enough, Justice Douglas, the author of the 
majority opinion in Kahn v. Shevin, joined him in the dissent with Justice Marshall as well.
207
 
Justice Brennan wrote that due to the fact that the condition of a woman’s pregnancy was used to 
exclude coverage, he believe that this amounted to a “dissimilar treatment of men and women, 
on the basis of physical characteristic inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitut[ing] sex 
discrimination.”208 Justice Brennan voiced his concern with the Court’s backslide away from a 
higher standard of review of sex-discrimination issues when he wrote, 
[B]y its decision today, the Court appears willing to abandon that higher standard 
of review without satisfactorily explaining what differentiates the gender-based 
classification employed in this case from those found unconstitutional in Reed and 
Frontiero. The Court’s decision threatens to return men and women to a time 
when “traditional” equal protection analysis sustained legislative classifications 
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that treated differently members of a particular sex solely because of their sex. 
See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 
464 (1948); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
209
  
 
Justice Brennan cited to several Supreme Court sex-discrimination cases in his dissent. 
Some to use as examples of what precedent the Court should not use as in the cases of Muller, 
Goesaert, and Hoyt
210
; and what cases Justice Brennan thought the Court should use as in Reed 
and Frontiero.
211
 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan did not include any legislative history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in his dissent in an attempt to sway the Court to an alternate decision. 
Taylor v. Louisiana (1975).
212
 In 1975 the Court heard the case of Taylor v. Louisiana, a 
jury selection case eerily similar to the case in Hoyt. The 8 – 1 decision produced the majority 
opinion written by Justice White and the lone dissenting opinion written by Justice Rehnquist.
213
 
The appellant, “Billy J. Taylor,” was convicted for “aggravated kidnaping”214 by a jury that 
contained no women. A State of Louisiana Constitutional provision mandated that “a woman 
should not be selected for jury service unless she had previously filed a written declaration of her 
desire to be subject to jury service.”215 Taylor brought the case to the Supreme Court because he 
was “deprived of what he claimed to be his federal constitutional right to “’a fair trial by jury of 
a representative segment of the community …,’”216 in violation of “his Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right[s].”217 
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Justice White began his analysis of the case by writing that the holding in Duncan v. 
Louisiana (1968) was part of the background of the case because “the Sixth Amendment’s 
provision for jury trial [was] made binding on the States by virtue of [its selective incorporation 
into] the Fourteenth Amendment.”218 Justice White stated that it was an “unmistakable import” of 
the Supreme Court “that the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the 
community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”219 
Remarkably, Justice White referred to the legislative history of the “Federal Jury Selection and 
Service Act of 1968” in the form of “Committee Reports of both the House and the Senate” in 
his argument.
220
 
Justice White wrote that the Court was “persuaded that the fair-cross-section requirement 
is violated by the systematic exclusion of women, who in the judicial district involved here 
amounted to 53% of the citizens eligible for jury service.”221 In the process of reaching this 
conclusion, Justice White wrote “the judgment that women are sufficiently numerous and 
distinct from men and that if they are systematically eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth 
Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement cannot be satisfied.”222 Justice White next moved to 
distinguish the decision the Court made in Hoyt. Justice White wrote that the jury selection 
“system” employed in the Hoyt case passed a “sufficiently rational basis” test, but, that 
Hoyt “did not involve a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a 
fair cross section of the community and the prospect of depriving him of that right 
if women as a class are systematically excluded. The right to a proper jury cannot 
be overcome on merely rational grounds. There must be weightier reasons if a 
distinctive class representing 53% of the eligible jurors is for all practical 
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purposes to be excluded from jury service. No such basis has been tendered 
here.
223
 
 
It is not clear if the “weightier reasons” (or heightened scrutiny) that Justice White was 
referring to was meant to cover laws and statutes concerning strictly jury selection, or if laws and 
statutes involving the discrimination of women required a “weightier reasons.”224 Regardless of 
that quandary, Justice White was crystal clear when he opined that “[i]f it was ever the case that 
women were unqualified to sit on juries or were so situated that none of them should be required 
to perform jury service, that time has long since passed.”225 To his credit, Justice White did cite 
to and quote from the legislative history involving the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 
1968, but unfortunately for our case, he did not refer to legislative history from the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Stanton v. Stanton (1975).
226
 The Supreme Court reviewed the case between Stanton v. 
Stanton in 1975 to decide if it was constitutionally justifiable under the Fourteenth Amendment 
for a father to be obligated to pay child support for his daughter until the age of 18 years old, 
while his child support obligations to his son do not end until he is 21 years old.
227
 The 8 – 1 
decision produced the majority opinion written by Justice Blackmun and the lone dissenting 
opinion written by Justice Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun wrote that the members of the Court 
“find it necessary in this case to decide whether a classification based on sex is inherently 
suspect.”228 Justice Blackmun wrote that the Court felt that Reed v. Reed was the “controlling” 
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case in this matter and that “[t]he test here, then, is whether the difference in sex between 
children warrants the distinction … drawn by the Utah statute. We conclude that it does not.”229 
In a noteworthy portion of the opinion, Justice Blackmun writes that; “We therefore 
conclude that under any test – compelling state interest, or rational basis, or something in 
between – [the Utah statute], in the context of child support, does not survive an equal protection 
attack.”230 “[O]r something in between”231 rational basis and compelling/strict scrutiny is a not so 
subtle code by Justice Blackmun and the Court that there may be a heightened scrutiny that the 
Court would be willing to accept regarding gender. The upward movement toward this more 
stringent test for sex-discrimination was encouraging for American women, but, Justice 
Blackmun and the majority in this opinion still did not refer to, or cite to, legislative history from 
the Fourteenth Amendment as part of its decision. 
Craig v. Boren (1976).
232
 In the case Craig v. Boren, Justice Brennan delivered the 
opinion for the majority of the Court. Not since the plurality opinion in Frontiero from three 
years earlier has Justice Brennan’s name been mentioned as the author of a non-dissenting sex-
discrimination case opinion. This time he had the majority of the Court with him. The case 
before the Court involved a pair of Oklahoma statutes. Both statutes prohibiting the sale of 3.2% 
beer; one prohibited the sale to males under the age of 21, and the second to females under the 
age of 18.
233
 The appellants Craig, a male between the age of 18 and 21 years old, and Whitener, 
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a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, brought a complaint that claimed the “gender-based differential” 
in the statutes amounted to an “invidious discrimination against males 18-20 years of age.”234 
Justice Brennan began his analysis of the statutes by reviewing the precedents set in Reed 
v. Reed. Justice Brennan wrote “that Reed emphasized that statutory classifications that 
distinguish between males and females are “’subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause.’”235 Justice Brennan also wrote that “[t]o withstand [a] constitutional challenge, previous 
cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and 
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”236 This language “established 
intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review for sex classifications.”237 
Justice Brennan gave Reed v. Reed the credit for “provid[ing] the underpinning” for later 
Supreme Court decisions that “invalidated statutes” that employed gender “as an inaccurate 
proxy for other, more germane bases of classification.”238 Justice Brennan’s Craig opinion gave 
life to words and phrases that would be later echoed in other Supreme Court sex-discrimination 
opinions; phrases like “’archaic and overbroad’” generalizations,” and “increasingly outdated 
misconceptions concerning the role of females.”239 
Although the Court agreed with Oklahoma “that traffic safety was an important 
governmental objective,” Justice Brennan and the majority of the Court did not believe that “the 
sex classification, based on statistical evidence indicating a greater propensity in males to drive 
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while intoxicated, to be substantially related to that objective.”240 Therefore, the Court held that 
the Oklahoma “3.2% beer statute invidiously discriminate[d] against males 18-20 years of 
age.”241 In a process of ruling that the Twenty-first Amendment argument of the appellee did not 
“save the invidious gender-based discrimination from invalidation as a denial of equal protection 
of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment[,]”242 Justice Brennan quoted an unnamed 
“commentator [that] remarked[]” about the “history of the Twenty-first Amendment,”243 but no 
other history, legislative or otherwise, was mentioned regarding the Fourteenth Amendment in 
his opinion in Craig. 
It is worth noting that Justice Brennan and the majority in Craig “did not discuss the origin 
of its new “’intermediate’” standard.”244 The opinion just continued to “simply cite[] Reed.”245 
Although the Court in Reed applied the minimum rationality test, it did so while engaging “in an 
analysis and reach[ing] a result far less forgiving than usual under that standard.”246 Therefore, 
Justice Brennan used the opinion in Craig to “set[] out in concrete terms the unstated heightened 
scrutiny employed in Reed.”247 
Orr v. Orr (1979).
248
 Justice Brennan is once again at center stage as the author of the 
majority opinion in Orr v. Orr. In the 1979 decision, the Court heard a case regarding the 
constitutionality of male only alimony in a divorce case.
249
 Justice Brennan said that just because 
the “classification expressly discriminates against men rather than women does not protect it 
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from scrutiny” under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.250 The Court 
applied the intermediate standard of review to the case stating that “’classifications by gender 
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement 
of those objectives.’”251 The Court agreed with Mr. Orr’s views that the “Alabama alimony 
statutes [] effectively announc[ed] the State’s preference for an allocation of family 
responsibilities under which the wife plays a dependent role.”252 
Justice Brennan and the majority decided that the “[reduction] of the disparity in economic 
condition between men and women” was an important governmental objective and that what 
remained to be determined was “whether the classification at issue here is “’substantially related 
to achievement of those objectives.’”253 In holding the statutes in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court found that the “gender-based distinction [in the Alabama statutes] 
[was][] gratuitous[]” and that “it would cost the State nothing more, if it were to treat men and 
women equally by making alimony burdens independent of sex.”254 Justice Brennan warned that 
statutes designed to “compensate” for the “effects of past discrimination must be carefully 
tailored[,]” as not to fall into the “inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the “’proper 
place’” of women and their need for special protection.”255 Once again, Justice Brennan cites to 
many previous Supreme Court cases involving sex-discrimination, but he does not cite to or refer 
to the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment in the majority opinion of the Court. 
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Parham v. Hughes (1979).
256
 In the unfortunate case of Parham v. Hughes, the Court was 
split into two plurality opinions with Justice Powell concurring with the prevailing group of 
justices led by Justice Stewart. No real precedent was set with this case as there was no five 
justice majority opinion, although the Georgia statute was upheld.
257
 The case was brought by an 
appellant whose illegitimate child and birth mother were killed in a car accident.
258
 A Georgia 
statute made it impossible by law for the father of an illegitimate child to recover for the 
wrongful death of that child; alternatively, the mother of an illegitimate child could recover.
259
 
Justice Stewart, writing for the prevailing plurality opinion, stated that “[i]n the absence of 
invidious discrimination [] a court is not free under the aegis of the Equal Protection Clause to 
substitute its judgment for the will of the people of a State as expressed in the laws passed by 
their popularly elected legislatures.”260 Meaning that unless there is a legitimate discrimination 
calling for a heightened review of a State statute, a rational basis test must be used which gives 
great deference to the duly elected legislators who created the law. Justice Stewart and three 
other justices did not see an invidious discrimination involving the statute; what they saw was a 
statute that differentiated between fathers of legitimate children and fathers of illegitimate 
children.
261
 This circumstance, as Justice Stewart saw it, warranted a rational analysis.
262
 
Justice White, writing for the other non-prevailing plurality justices in their dissent, saw it 
a different way.
263
 Justice White saw it as a “particular discrimination in this case [that] is but 
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part of the pervasive sex discrimination in the statute conferring the right to sue for the wrongful 
death of a child.”264 Justice White wrote that because the “[a]ppellant is the father, rather than the 
mother, of a deceased illegitimate child[]” it is that “reason alone he may not bring an action for 
the wrongful death of his child.”265 Justice White accused the prevailing plurality of a “startling 
circularity” to their argument, but to no avail.266 Neither plurality opinions, nor the concurring 
opinion, cited to or referred to the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment in their 
arguments. 
Caban v. Mohammed (1979).
267
 The case of Caban v. Mohammed was heard by the 
Supreme Court in 1979 as a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a New York statute that gave 
unwed mothers veto rights on their natural children’s adoption but did not afford those same 
rights to unwed fathers of the same children, basing the distinction solely upon gender.
268
 In this 
case, Abdiel Caban’s two “natural children were adopted by their natural mother and stepfather 
without his consent.”269 Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the five justice majority and used 
the intermediate standard of review for this case.
270
 
As part of its analysis, Justice Powell and the majority looked into the legislative history of 
the New York statute for guidance in reviewing the State’s argument that it’s important 
governmental interest was “in promoting the adoption of illegitimate children.”271 Justice Powell 
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wrote that the history behind the statute was “sparse”272 but agreed with New York that the 
“State’s interest in providing for the well-being of illegitimate children is an important one.”273 
But Justice Powell did not agree with New York that “the distinction in [the statute] between 
unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers … [provided] a substantial relation to the State’s 
interest.”274 Justice Powell wrote in closing that “we believe that [the New York statute] is 
another example of “’overbroad generalizations’” in gender-based classifications.”275 Other than 
Justice Powell and the majority’s research into the legislative history behind the New York 
statute in controversy, which is refreshing to report, no other legislative history was mentioned 
regarding the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney (1979).
276
 The year 1979 was a busy 
one for sex-discrimination cases heard before the Supreme Court of the United States. Next on 
our list is the case Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.
277
 The seven justice 
majority opinion was authored by Justice Stewart.
278
 Ms. Helen B. Feeney had brought the suit 
against the Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts in an effort to challenge “the 
Massachusetts veterans’ preference statute, [] on the ground that it discriminate[d] against 
women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”279 Ms. 
Feeney believed the statute that said that “all veterans who qualify for state civil service 
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positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans[] … 
operate[d] overwhelmingly to the advantage of males.”280 
Justice Stewart, in keeping with the prevailing precedent, analyzed the case using the 
intermediate standard of review.
281
 As part of that standard, Justice Stewart wrote that “to 
withstand a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment … any state law overtly or covertly designed to prefer males over females in public 
employment would require an exceedingly persuasive justification.”282 This intermediate 
scrutiny language would surface again in Mississippi University v. Hogan and United States v. 
Virginia some years into the future. The majority held that, after research into the legislative 
history of the statute, Ms. Feeney did not prove “that a gender-based discriminatory purpose has, 
at least in some measure, shaped the Massachusetts veterans’ preference legislation.”283 Ms. 
Feeney argued that the dominant sex in the military leads to a dominance in the number of males 
as veterans of the military.
284
 In a matter of fact tone, Justice Stewart wrote that “[t]he enlistment 
policies of the Armed Services may well have discriminated on the basis of sex[] [but] … the 
history of discrimination against women in the military is not on trial in this case.”285 In the end, 
the majority viewed the statute as having no discriminatory scheme in “a law that by design 
…prefers veterans as such[,]” with simply the gender-neutral term veteran carrying the day.286 
In the dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, opined that even 
though the statute was gender-“neutral in form, the statute [was][] anything but neutral in 
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application[,]” and that it should be the “burden” of the “State to establish that sex-based 
considerations played no part in the choice of the particular legislative scheme.”287 Justice 
Marshall wrote that the “legislative history of the statute” showed the State of Massachusetts 
recognized “the impact the preference system would have on women,” and took steps to 
“mitigate that impact only with respect to certain traditionally female occupations.”288 Justice 
Marshall stated that the “statutory scheme … perpetuates … archaic assumptions about women’s 
roles” that the Court had previously struck down; and that the majority’s “conclusion to the 
contrary … displays a singularly myopic view of the facts.”289 In this case, both sides of the 
decision used legislative history in the process of rendering its opinions, but neither side chose to 
use the legislative history from the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Califano v. Westcott (1979).
290
 In the case of Califano v. Westcott, two New England 
married couples brought what would be a class action suit challenging Section 407 of the Social 
Security Act which “provides benefits to families whose dependent children have been deprived 
of parental support because of the unemployment of the father, but does not provide such 
benefits when the mother becomes unemployed.”291 The couples said that the gender-based 
section of the Social Security Act violated their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments,
292
 but Justice Blackmun and the majority analyzed the section against the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.293  
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In writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun said that “[f]or mothers who are the primary 
providers for their families, and who are unemployed, [the challenged section] is obviously 
gender biased, for it deprives them and their families of benefits solely on the basis of their 
sex.”294 Justice Blackmun pointed out that in the recent past the Supreme Court of the United 
States “has not hesitated to strike down gender classifications … [in which] the statute 
“’discriminates against one particular category of family – that in which the female spouse is a 
wage earner.’”295 Administrators for the government argued that the challenged section was 
designed by Congress to make desertion by fathers more difficult, but after extensive research 
into the legislative history of the challenged section by Justice Blackmun and the majority, this 
argument was dismissed.
296
 To that end, Justice Blackmun wrote that “[t]here is no evidence, in 
the legislative history or elsewhere, that a father has less incentive to desert in a family where the 
mother is the breadwinner and becomes unemployed, than in a family where the father is the 
breadwinner and becomes unemployed.”297 Justice Blackmun continued by stating, “Congress, 
with an image of the “’traditional family’” in mind, simply assumed that the father would be the 
family breadwinner, and that the mother’s employment role, if any, would be secondary.”298 
In the application of the intermediate standard of review, Justice Blackmun concluded 
“that the gender classification [in the challenged section] is not substantially related to attainment 
of any important and valid statutory goals.” Additionally, Justice Blackmun wrote that the 
challenged section represented “part of the “’baggage of sexual stereotypes,’” that presumes the 
father has the “’primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,’” while the mother is 
                                                          
294
 Id. at 84. 
295
 Id. 
296
 See generally Id. at 84-87. 
297
 Id. at 87. 
298
 Id. at 88. 
50 
 
the “’center of the home and family life.’”299 Justice Blackmun warned that any “[l]egislation 
that rest[ed] on such presumptions, without more, [could not][] survive under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment[;]”300 and presumably under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
This opinion by Justice Blackmun appears to show evidence of substantial research by the 
Supreme Court of the United States into the legislative history behind Congressional legislation. 
Unfortunately for our purposes here, the analysis was under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and not the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the dawn of 
the 1980s, “opinions from all points on the ideological spectrum cited legislative history freely 
and generously.”301 Justices used the legislative history to both “support … the controversial 
proposition of how to implement a mix of broad congressional purposes absent specific intent,” 
but just as often to “support [] noncontroversial propositions.”302 As we will see, this sentiment 
of free and generous use of legislative history is not reflected in the 1980s sex-discrimination 
cases. 
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Company (1980).
303
 In the case of Wengler v. 
Druggists Mutual Insurance Company, the appellant Mr. Wengler, a widower, brought a case 
claiming a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in which a 
provision of the Missouri workers’ compensation laws denied him benefits from his wife’s work-
related death.
304
 Mr. Wengler claimed it was an invalid provision due to a “gender-based 
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discrimination”305 stemming from the provision that would not allow a husband to collect work-
related death benefits unless that husband proved that he was either “incapacitated []or 
dependent on his wife’s earnings,” of which the Mr. Wengler was neither.306 The provision did 
not have a similar requirement for female beneficiaries.
307
 
Justice White authored the opinion for the seven justice majority and applied the 
intermediate standard of review to the analysis of the Missouri statutory provision.
308
 Justice 
White wrote that the challenged provision of the Missouri workers’ compensation law 
“indisputably mandates gender-based discrimination[] … [and that] it is apparent that the statute 
discriminates against both men and women.”309 Justice White stated that due to the statutory 
scheme, “Mrs. Wengler would have been conclusively presumed to be dependent” on Mr. 
Wengler in the event of his death, with an automatic “statutory amount for life or until she 
remarried.”310 Justice White opined that “this kind of discrimination against working women … 
[is] found unjustified.”311 “Accordingly,” wrote Justice White, “we reverse … and remand the 
case … for further proceedings.”312 No legislative history, Fourteenth Amendment or otherwise, 
was cited to, or referred to, as part of Justice White’s majority opinion. 
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Burger Court Cases from 1981 – 1986 
 
Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County (1981).
313
 In the case of Michael M. (a 
minor) v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, the justices were split into a four justice plurality 
opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, with one concurring opinion by Justices Stewart and one 
opinion concurring in the judgment by Justice Blackman; so no substantial constitutional case 
law was created from the decision.
314
 The case was brought by a minor male charged under 
California’s statutory rape law that “made[] men alone criminally liable for the act of sexual 
intercourse[]” with a female under the age of 18 years.315 The petitioner Michael M. claimed that 
the statute was discriminatorily schemed in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
316
 
Justice Rehnquist recalled in the plurality opinion that the Supreme Court had 
“consistently upheld statutes where the gender classification [was] not invidious, but rather 
realistically reflect[ed] the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain 
circumstances.”317 The plurality justices felt “satisfied” that the State of California had a “strong 
interest in [the] preventi[on] [of illegitimate] [] pregnancy” due to the fact that those children 
who are born of the “illegitimacy makes them likely candidates to become wards of the State.”318 
Justice Rehnquist and the other justices of the plurality ruled that the California statute that 
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“directly [] prohibit[ed] a male from having sexual intercourse with a minor female … [was] 
sufficiently related to the State’s objective to pass constitutional muster.”319 
Unsatisfied with the opinion from Justice Rehnquist and the plurality, Justice Brennan 
authored a dissent from the judgment challenging the notion that the California statute could not 
be drafted into a gender-neutral form and still remain effective for the States purposes.
320
 Justice 
Brennan wrote that “at least 37 States [] have enacted gender-neutral statutory rape laws[,]” of 
which, the States of “Arizona, Florida, and Illinois permit prosecution of both minor females and 
minor males for engaging in mutual sexual conduct.”321 “California has introduced no 
evidence[,]” wrote Justice Brennan, “that those States have been handicapped by the 
enforcement problems the plurality finds so persuasive.”322 Although a modest review of the 
legislative history of the California statute was mentioned by multiple justices in the several 
opinions in the case, there was no mention of a review of the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment having been done by any justices involved with this case. 
Kirchberg v. Feenstra (1981).
323
 In the case of Kirchberg v. Feenstra, the Court ruled on 
whether a “Louisiana statute that gave a husband, as “’head and master’” of property jointly 
owned with his wife, the unilateral right to dispose of such property without his spouse’s 
consent[]” violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.324 Authoring 
what, except for a modest technicality, would have been a rare unanimous ruling by the Court, 
Justice Marshall’s opinion garnered the full support of six justices and a concurring opinion 
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which covered the remaining two justices.
325
 Applying the intermediate standard of review to the 
case, Justice Marshall said that, 
[b]y granting the husband exclusive control over the disposition of community 
property, [the challenged statute] clearly embodies the type of express gender-
based discrimination that we have found unconstitutional absent a showing that 
the classification is tailored to further an important governmental interest.
326
 
 
In ruling that the Louisiana statute clearly violated the Equal Protection Clause, Justice 
Marshall reminded the losing appellant that the “’absence of an insurmountable barrier’” will not 
redeem an otherwise unconstitutionally discriminatory law.”327 Alternatively, Justice Marshall 
wrote that “the burden remains on the party seeking to uphold a statute that expressly 
discriminates on the basis of sex to advance an “’exceedingly persuasive justification’” for the 
challenged classification.”328 In what was a straight-forward and relatively short opinion, Justice 
Marshall did not cite to or refer to any legislative history, Fourteenth Amendment or otherwise. 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982).
329
 The case of Mississippi University 
for Women v. Hogan finds the first woman justice to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, authoring the majority opinion for the Court.330 The issue 
presented to the Court for review was “whether a state statute that excludes males from enrolling 
in a state-supported professional nursing school violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”331 Justice O’Connor aptly applies the firmly entrenched intermediate 
standard of review to the case citing the “burden” of the State in displaying an “’exceedingly 
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persuasive justification’” in which the challenged classification serves “’important governmental 
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’” are “’substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.’”332  
For the State of Mississippi, the argument they forwarded to the Court was that 
“maintaining the single-sex admissions policy of MUW’s School of Nursing is that it 
compensates for discrimination against women and, therefore, constitutes educational affirmative 
action[;]” but that argument, the Court found, was “unpersuasive.”333 Justice O’Connor stated in 
a footnote that the “State ha[d] failed to establish that the legislature intended the single-sex 
policy to compensate for any perceived discrimination.”334 Ultimately, Justice O’Connor and the 
majority ruled that “MUW’s policy of denying males the right to enroll for credit in its School of 
Nursing violate[d] the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”335 Although 
Justice O’Connor pointed out that the State of Mississippi did not provide proof of the 
legislator’s intent with the challenged statute through legislative history of the statute, Justice 
O’Connor and the majority did not offer legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment or its 
Framers’ intent for expanding women’s rights. 
In the absence of legislative history from the Fourteenth Amendment to rely on, Justice 
O’Connor and the majority relied on a decades-worth of past sex-discrimination Supreme Court 
cases, including; Reed v. Reed, Caban v. Mohammed, Orr v. Orr, Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, and Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., to just 
name those cited in Justice O’Connor’s recounting of the intermediate standard of review for 
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gender-based discrimination cases.
336
 Without the need for research into the legislative history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the documented evidence that some of the Framers intended to 
establish expanded rights for women, the modern Supreme Court has well established Court 
decisions lacking in grounding from legislative history to cite to for its sex-discrimination 
jurisprudence. 
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Cases decided during the Chief Justice William Rehnquist Court 
 
Rehnquist Court Cases from 1986 – 1996 
 
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994).
337
 In the case of J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B. (a 
minor child), Justice Blackmun authored the opinion by the narrow majority of the Court 
regarding “whether the Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of 
gender, just as it prohibits discrimination on the basis of race.”338 Justice Blackmun and the 
majority, requiring an exceedingly persuasive justification through the intermediate standard of 
review, held that “gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and 
impartiality.”339 The background of the case involved a complaint for paternity and child support 
brought by the State of Alabama.
340
 For trial, the lower court assembled “36 potential jurors,” to 
which the State used “peremptory strikes” as part of the voir dire process to ultimately attain a 
jury comprised of only female jurors.
341
 Before the all-female jury was “empaneled,” the 
petitioner voiced his objection to the use of the peremptory challenges “solely on the basis of 
gender” by the State “in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”342 The petitioner’s logic was that it was previously ruled in Batson v. Kentucky 
that “peremptory strikes solely on the basis of race” in the voir dire process violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and that because the Amendment “similarly forbids intentional 
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discrimination on the basis of gender[,]” the State action in the instant case should be ruled 
unconstitutional as well.
343
 The Court agreed. 
In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun set forth to recite the history of sex-
discrimination in the United States starting from the English common law exclusion of women 
from juries “under “’the doctrine of propter defectum sexus, literally, the ‘defect of sex[,]’” a 
brief stop at Bradwell v. State, up to and through Frontiero v. Richardson; a lengthy testimonial 
to say the least.
344
 Justice Blackmun opined that for the purposes of this case it was not necessary 
to determine “whether women or racial minorities have suffered more at the hands of 
discriminatory state actors during the decades of our Nation’s history[;]”345 nor was it necessary 
for the instant case to decide the “open question” from Justice Ginsburg as to “whether 
classifications based on gender are inherently suspect[,]” raising the review of gender-based 
classifications to a strict scrutiny standard of review.
346
  
In ruling that the lower court’s decision was reversed and ordered to be remanded back for 
further proceedings, Justice Blackmun cautioned that due to the fact that “gender and race are 
overlapping categories[]” in the case of minority women, “gender can be used as a pretext for 
racial discrimination[] … allowing parties to remove racial minorities from the jury not because 
of their race, but because of their gender.”347 This would allow, wrote Justice Blackmun, the 
erosion of “well-established equal protection principles and could insulate effectively racial 
discrimination from judicial scrutiny.”348 
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In J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the majority did not 
cite to or refer to the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, but Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion came extremely close to doing just that.
349
 Although Justice Kennedy 
admitted that he was in “full agreement” with the majority opinion, he felt it necessary to 
“explain [his] understanding of why [the Court’s] [] precedents lead to [the] [] conclusion[]” by 
the majority.
350
 Justice Kennedy wrote; 
Though in some initial drafts the Fourteenth Amendment was written to prohibit 
discrimination against “persons because of race, color or previous condition of 
servitude,” the Amendment submitted for consideration and later ratified 
contained more comprehensive terms: “No State shall … deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” See Oregon v. Mitchell, 
400 U.S. 112, 172-173, 27 L. Ed. 2
nd
 272, 91 S. Ct. 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); B. Kendrick, Journal of the Joint 
Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, 39th Congress, 1865-1867, pp. 90-91, 
97-100 (1914).
351
 
 
Admittedly, the blocked quote from above does not contain any citations from actual 
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it does come tantalizingly close. 
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy cites to a Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on 
Reconstruction from the 39th Congress of 1865-1867 by Benjamin B. Kendrick, originally 
published in 1914, for his commentary regarding the “initial drafts of the Fourteenth 
Amendment” and the Amendment’s eventually ratified “comprehensive terms.”352 Justice 
Kennedy curiously chose to reference the 1914 publication, even though actual transcripts from 
the 1865-1867 39th Congressional committee meetings were readily available to the Supreme 
Court justices, and the entire populous of this country for that matter, through the archives of the 
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library of Congress. The specific reasons for Justice Kennedy’s use of Mr. Kendrick’s 
publication rather than actual transcripts from the archives are not readily available to this author 
for use as part of this thesis. 
As Justice Kennedy continued to opine his “understanding of why [the Court’s] [] 
precedents lead to [the] [] conclusion[]”353 by the majority in J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 
Justice Kennedy wrote that due to the fact that there was “the necessity for the Nineteenth 
Amendment in 1920,” too much time that had passed “before the Equal Protection Clause was 
thought to reach beyond the purpose of prohibiting racial discrimination and to apply as well to 
discrimination based on sex.”354 Justice Kennedy wrote that the Supreme Court had “subjected 
governmental classifications based on sex to heightened scrutiny[] … [i]n over 20 cases 
beginning in 1971,” and that the “case law [] reveal[ed] a strong presumption that gender 
classifications are invalid.”355  
Justice Kennedy stated that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause and our constitutional tradition” 
are grounded in the concept that “individual [] rights [] are protected against lawless action by 
the government.”356 “The neutral phrasing of the Equal Protection Clause,” wrote Justice 
Kennedy, in extending its protections to “’any person,’” reveals its concern with the rights of 
individuals.”357 Concluding his understanding, Justice Kennedy stated that it was the “neutrality” 
in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee to equal protection from the law that 
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was “confirmed by the fact that the Court ha[d] no difficulty in finding a constitutional wrong in 
this [gender-based] case.”358 
United States v. Virginia (1996).
359
  In what should only be described as the universe 
coming around full circle, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the majority 
opinion in United States v. Virginia, a quarter century after arguing on the side of Sally Reed in 
1971, and as an ACLU lead attorney, arguing on a majority of the cases that compile the sex-
discrimination jurisprudence we see today.
360
 The U.S. v. Virginia case started in 1990, 
“prompted by a complaint filed … by a female high-school student seeking admission to VMI, 
… alleging that VMI’s exclusively male admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”361 Justice Ginsburg once again applied the intermediate standard 
of review to the case ruling that VMI and the State of Virginia “ha[d] shown no “’exceedingly 
persuasive justification’” for excluding all women from the citizen-soldier training afforded by 
VMI.”362 
 In the process of explaining how the majority developed its decision in the case, Justice 
Ginsburg wrote that the Court’s “skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or 
opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history.”363 Justice Ginsburg acknowledged 
that for over 130 years of history of the United States, “women did not count among voters 
composing “’We the People.’”364 And in recalling the decision in Reed, Justice Ginsburg wrote 
that “[i]n 1971, for the first time in our Nation’s history, this Court ruled in favor of a woman 
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who complained that her State had denied her the equal protection of its laws.”365 The history 
continued from cases including Reed v. Reed, to Kirchberg v. Feenstra, through Stanton v. 
Stanton.”366 Justice Ginsburg wrote that the Supreme Court “carefully inspected official action 
… that denie[d] opportunities to women (or to men) … in post-Reed decisions … [w]ithout 
equating gender classifications, for all purposes, to classifications based on race or national 
origin.”367 While it is true that Justice Ginsburg cited to a majority of the cases that make up the 
modern sex-discrimination jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, she did not cite to or refer to the 
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment as proof that it was used as part of the Court’s 
decision making process in ruling in United States v. Virginia. 
The majority’s decision in the VMI case appeared to reinforced the concept that future 
controversies regarding gender-based discrimination, for the most part, will be viewed with a 
heightened scrutiny, but what that elevated scrutiny actually means was the cause for much 
debate by dissenter Justice Scalia and concurring dissenter Chief Justice Rehnquist.
368
 The use of 
the phrase “’exceedingly persuasive justification’” numerous times by Justice Ginsburg in the 
majority opinion in the VMI case “provoked a bitter dissent from Justice Scalia, who essentially 
accused the majority of abandoning intermediate for strict scrutiny on the sly.”369 In his opinion 
concurring in Justice Scalia’s dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “terms like “’important 
governmental objective’” and “’substantially related’” are hardly models of precision, [but] they 
have more content and specificity than does the phrase “’exceedingly persuasive 
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justification.’”370 Chief Justice Rehnquist felt like “[t]hat phrase is best confined, as it was first 
used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of 
the test itself.”371 Additionally, Justice Scalia forwarded the contention that the “decision ignored 
history, … but he did not seriously attempt to conduct [his own] [] inquiry.”372 
Legislative History: Justice Breyer and Inquiries into Congressional Intent. As has 
been the case for hundreds of years, “[t]he language of a statute may admittedly be vague,” and 
judges who are attempting to construe the meaning of terms from an enacted statute (or 
Amendment) “’cannot afford to ignore those obvious tools (such as legislative history) which 
members of Congress use to explain what they are doing and to describe the meaning of the 
words used in the statute.’”373 Current Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer believes that 
legislative history is “an essential channel of communication between those who create the law 
and those who interpret and enforce it.”374 Some are concerned that due to the Supreme Courts’ 
doctrine based on a “bifurcated framework of review[,]” there is little “dialog between the courts 
and the political branches about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment[,]” which “grants 
Congress the power to enforce the amendment’s provisions by appropriate legislation.”375 But 
Justice Breyer insists that preserving “the use of legislative history serves one of the most 
important goals of our legal system – creating and maintaining laws “’consistent with the 
reasonable expectations of those who live within it.”376 
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As the former Chief Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, Justice Breyer possesses 
a unique perspective regarding legislative history.
377
 As examples of other organizations that 
function similarly to Congress’s “’group mind’” regarding “collective intent[,]” Justice Breyer 
cites – “law school faculty setting tuition levels, a basketball team making a play, and a tank 
corps implementing a battle plan” – groups that are all enthralled in a “coordinated action with a 
collective intent, though the individuals may not have identical subjective awareness.”378 
Similarly, Congress with its “bureaucratic organization” working through “committees actively 
engaged … [in] generating legislation[,]” lawmakers occupy roles in which they participate via 
“supervising and handling active discussions on the controversial subjects of proposed bills,” all 
while the “legislative history [is being] record[ed] [regarding] the details of real choices and 
decisions.”379 
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Conclusion 
 
“Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence has never sought to ascertain the historical meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment for sex discrimination.”380 What that statement says is that there is 
140 years of sex-discrimination jurisprudence based upon the Fourteenth Amendment without 
even a trace of information included in Supreme Court opinions regarding indications of what 
the actual intent of the Framers of the Amendment could have been. This thesis has established 
the concept that throughout the history of the Supreme Court of the United States, legislative 
history has been used at least from time to time in the process of adjudicating cases. So then, 
why is there a complete absence of legislative history from the Fourteenth Amendment regarding 
sex-discrimination from Supreme Court opinions? 
“The Constitution’s text alone is evidence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s broad 
scope.”381 “The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were free to use language that was either 
broad or narrow[,]”382 but the Framers chose to use broad and ambiguous language. If a statute or 
Amendment has language that is vague or ambiguous, Supreme Court justices throughout the 
decades have turned to legislative history to ascertain the meaning the Framers of the legislation 
intended it to mean. But the Court’s legislative history research is non-existent related to sex-
discrimination and women’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This author is not 
contending that all it would have taken was for Justice Bradley in 1873 to look into committee 
transcripts from the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 and he would have decided to 
let Mrs. Bradwell become an attorney; but maybe it would not have taken almost 100 years 
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before the highest court in the land held that a State had violated the rights of women under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In the modern era, United States Supreme Court sex-discrimination jurisprudence has been 
established through a rereading of the Fourteenth Amendment, although, the current 
interpretation only “prevent[s] certain kinds of discrimination based on sex.”383 The question 
regarding if gender should be considered to be analogous with race or if female rights should be 
stand alone may be better answered via a look into the legislative history regarding what the 
Framers intended. The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment could provide support 
for or against what is perceived as the ultimate congressional purposes for the Amendment. 
Regardless, the history should be accessed. One argument is that the “Fourteenth Amendment’s 
meaning … was designed to be applied to [] facts as we [see] … them today, not as people 
understood [them] [150] years ago.”384 But the only way to know for sure is for the Supreme 
Court to research the Fourteenth Amendment legislative history relating to women and gender 
and use that information as part of an opinion. If the Framers intended us to view the text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment specifically as it was known as in the 19th century, the Amendment 
would have “call[ed] on subsequent generations to apply it based on misinformation prevalent in 
1868.”385  
For certain, the Framers “could have explicitly excluded women from Section One’s 
protections, but they did not do so.”386 Due to the absence of research into the legislative history 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the documented evidence that some of the Framers intended to 
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establish expanded rights for women, the modern Supreme Court has well established Court 
decisions lacking in grounding from legislative history, and will continue to lack, as the Court 
crafts its future sex-discrimination jurisprudence. 
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